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Deprivation of liberty and adults with 
incapacity: a Scottish perspective
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Strasbourg Bournewood ruling (HL v UK 
(2005) 40 EHRR 32) made it clear that restrictive 
measures informally adopted in relation to 
persons lacking capacity to make valid decisions 
about their care and treatment will violate Article 
5 ECHR (the right to liberty) where such measures 
amount a deprivation of liberty. As in England 
and Wales, this therefore raised questions as to 
how Article 5 “watertight” the law in Scotland is 
concerning the care and treatment of persons 
with, for example, learning disabilities or 
dementia.  
 
In order for a measure amounting to a 
deprivation of liberty to be lawful in terms of 
Article 5(1)(e) ECHR (justifying detention on 
ground of “mental disorder”) it must, amongst 
other things,  have a legal basis and be a 
proportionate response to the particular 
situation, concern a person who has a genuine 
mental disorder and provide legal safeguards for 
the person deprived of their liberty (such as the 
ability to challenge the legality of such 
deprivation of liberty before a court or tribunal 
and immediate release where the detention is 
found to be unlawful or no longer necessary).  
 
For Scotland, two questions, in particular, have 
arisen as a result of Bournewood:-   
 
1. What actually constitutes a “deprivation 
of liberty” engaging Article 5? 
 
No definition of “deprivation of liberty” engaging 
Article 5 is given in the ECHR. Case law has 
provided broad guidance in terms of assessing 
whether such a deprivation of liberty has 
occurred (for example, the degree of control 
exercised over the person by those responsible 
for their care and treatment, the duration, type 
and intensity of the measures adopted and the 
ability of the person to give valid and informed 
consent to such measures) but the position is not 
entirely clear. 
 
 
It has, for instance, been argued that restrictive 
measures designed to give someone as much 
freedom as possible in light of a person’s 
particular disability do not actually amount to a 
deprivation of liberty engaging Article 5 (see HM 
v Switzerland (2002) ECHR 157, in particular the 
dissenting judgment of Judge Loucaides, and 
Nielsen v Denmark (1989) 11 EHRR 175 (see also 
Austin v UK (2012) 55 EHRR 14 and the English 
cases of A Local Authority v A (by her Guardian ad 
Litem, Judith Bennett-Hernandez), B A Local 
Authority v C (by her litigation friend the Official 
Solicitor), D, E  [2010] EWHC 978 (Fam)), 
R(Secretary of State for the Home Department) v 
Mental Health Review Tribunal [2002] EWCA Civ 
1868, R(G) v Mental Health Review Tribunal 
[2004] EWHC 2193 and Re MIG and MEG, Surrey 
County Council v CA and LA [2010] EWHC 785)).   
 
This approach has, however, received some 
criticism on the basis that “to benefit the person” 
(in other words, the purpose of the measure) 
does not form part of the assessment of whether 
a measure amounts to a deprivation of liberty 
and is not a specified justification in Article 
5(1)(e) to limit the right to liberty. It should 
perhaps also be noted that the Court considered 
that in both HM and Nielsen valid consent to the 
restrictions had been given (albeit by the boy’s 
mother in the latter case).   
 
AB v BR, Dr DM & Mental Health Tribunal for 
Scotland 
 
The case of AB v BR, Dr DM & Mental Health 
Tribunal for Scotland, 26 September 2012, 
unreported (Airdrie Sheriff Court) does, however, 
give an indication of judicial thinking in Scotland 
on the issue. Please note, however, that this 
judgment is currently subject to appeal to the 
Court of Session.  
 
In this case, the applicant (who suffers from 
mental disorder caused by alcohol misuse and 
bipolar disorder) was required, under the terms 
of a CTO, to reside at a Care Home which was a 
locked facility where residents can only leave and 
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return using a keypad. She claimed that she did 
not know the code for the keypad and had 
therefore been detained contrary to the Mental 
Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 
which only allows detention under a CTO in 
hospital (in other words, there was no legal basis 
for her detention).  The court determined that, in 
light of all the circumstances, she had not been 
detained. The overriding purpose of the 2003 Act 
is to provide appropriate care and treatment for 
persons with mental disorder. Medical evidence 
in this case demonstrated that a hospital-based 
order was not necessary but there were strong 
reasons supporting the use of the keypad at the 
care home. For instance, the applicant was a risk 
to road users and to herself if she left the home 
unaccompanied, she had a history of leaving 
hospital and her own home and placing herself at 
significant risk and she was known to be liable to 
exploitation. This was the minimum restriction 
required for her safety. Moreover, visits to her 
family were arranged fortnightly and she could go 
out locally provided she was supervised (and 
there appeared to be no delays or problem in 
organising this). She also had free access to the 
home’s gardens during the summer. For these 
reasons, it was considered that the restrictions 
imposed on the applicant did not amount to legal 
detention and were proportionate in the 
circumstances. The court, on the facts, also 
rejected the suggestion that guardianship would 
have been more appropriate way of securing the 
appellant’s welfare (see also comments in the 
next section about use of the 2003 Act).       
 
What is “normal”? 
 
It has also been suggested that restrictive 
measures should be assessed by reference to “an 
adult of similar age with the same capabilities 
and affected by the same condition or suffering 
the same inherent mental and physical 
disabilities and limitations.” In other words, what 
would be considered to be a “normal” measure 
for an individual in such specific circumstances. 
This argument was advanced in Cheshire West 
and Chester Council v P [2011] EWCA Civ 1257, 
per Munby LJ at paras 83 and 86. To this end, the 
UK Supreme Court Cheshire West ruling is eagerly 
anticipated although are mindful that this will be 
persuasive but not binding on the Scottish courts 
and, of course, that ultimate and definitive 
direction may come from Strasbourg in the 
future.  
 
2. Are the guardianship provisions in the Adults 
with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 Article 5 
compatible? 
 
Whilst the Act as it currently stands (see Part 6 of 
the Act) expressly authorises a welfare guardian 
to act, or not act, in certain ways (for example, a 
guardian must not place the adult in hospital for 
treatment for mental disorder against their will, 
s.64(2)(a)), it does not specifically empower a 
guardian to consent to a deprivation of liberty on 
behalf of the adult with incapacity. Nor does the 
Act expressly provide for the adult with 
incapacity to have such deprivation of liberty 
reviewed by the courts. Post-Bournewood the 
best advice has therefore tended to be that 
where an individual is unable to give valid 
consent, even if apparently compliant, to 
measures that might amount to a deprivation of 
liberty then there will have to be resort to use of 
the compulsory provisions in the 2003 Act with its 
better Article 5 compliant legal and procedural 
safeguards. However, this would only, of course, 
be applicable where the individual requires care 
and treatment for a mental disorder and the 2003 
Act’s criteria are fulfilled.  
 
Application in respect of R 
 
That being said, there has recently been judicial 
support for the view that provided the 
guardianship order permits a welfare guardian to 
deprive a person with incapacity of their liberty 
this constitutes the requisite lawful authority for 
the purposes of Article 5, presumably this being 
impliedly permitted by the 2000 Act.  
 
In the case of Application in respect of R 2013 
G.W.D. 13-293 welfare and financial guardianship 
powers were being sought for a 19 year old man 
with incapacity to allow him to move to suitable 
accommodation, a lease to be signed and the care 
package put in place for him. Essentially, the court 
held that where an adult is compliant with a care 
regime but legally incapable of consenting to it 
then they are deprived of their liberty contrary to 
Article 5 (1) ECHR unless they are placed under 
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such regime by virtue of the 2000 Act 
guardianship arrangements permitting this. Thus, 
the court considered that this will provide the 
necessary lawful authority required by Article 5 
ECHR although it left unanswered the question of 
Article 5 procedural safeguards. 
  
Another issue that has arisen following -
Bournewood is whether s.13ZA of the Social Work 
(Scotland) Act 1968 –which permits a local 
authority to move an adult to residential 
accommodation - allows the local authority to 
place the adult in care arrangements that amount 
to a deprivation of their liberty. Again, in 
Application in respect of R the court made it clear 
that it does not.   
 
For greater discussion of all these issues readers 
are referred to the Scottish Law Commission 
Discussion Paper on Adults with Incapacity, 2012, 
which provides an excellent and comprehensive 
analysis of the law and human rights 
considerations. For another, more practice 
focused, analysis, please see the Mental Welfare 
Commission for Scotland’s recent guidance on 
Deprivation of Liberty. 
 
Following its 2012 discussion paper and 
consultation, the Scottish Law Commission is to 
publish a draft Bill in 2014 and it is hoped that 
some clarity will emerge as a result of this.           
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